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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff a,nd Respondent,
Case
No. 9619

-vs.-

EDGAR GLEN CUDE,
Defenda,n,t a.nd Appellarn.t.

PETITION FOR REHEARING
STATEl\iENT OF POSITION ON REHEARING
The respondent, State of Utah, submits that the decision of the court heretofore filed on July 2, 1963, reversing the appellant's conviction of larceny, should be reexamined and that the original opinion should be withdrawn and the conviction affirmed.

ARGUMENT
POINT
THE COURT'S OPINION ASSUMES THAT,
IF THE DEFENDANT TOOK HIS VEHICLE
UNDER A GOOD FAITH BELIEF THAT HE
HAD A RIGHT TO THE POSSESSION OF HIS
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VEHICLE, SUCH GOOD FAITH BELIEF
COULD DESTROY THE REQUIRED MENS
REA THAT IS AN ELEMENT OF THE CRIME
CHARGED, WHICH ASSUMPTION IS ERROR.
Appellant, Edgar Glen Cude, was convicted of grand
larceny. The facts as indicated in the opinion of the
court are that the appellant took his automobile from a
garage repairman who had performed repairs upon the
vehicle. In Sta.te v. Pa.rker, 104 Utah 23, 137 P. 2d 626,
this court realized that an individual could be convicted
of grand larceny by destroying the lienholder's possessory right to the property upon which he has performed
repairs. In the court's decision rendered in the instant
matter, the court states:
"It is fundamental that an essential element of
larceny is the intent to steal the property of
another. Consequently, if there is any reasonable
basis in the evidence upon whir)l the jury could
believe that the accused thought he had a right to
take possession of his automobile, or if the evidence in that regard is such that it might raise
a reasonable doubt that he had the intent to steal,
then that issue should be presented to the jury.
The principle is correctly stated in 52 C.J.S., p.
999, that if the property was taken under any
' * * * circumstances from which the jury might
infer that the taking was under a claim of right,
the accused is entitled to an appropriate charge
distinguishing larceny from a mere trespass.' ''
It is apparently the position of the eourt that, if the
appellant took possession of his vehicle in good faith,
thinking that he had a right to do so, he could not have
2
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the n•quisite me11s rca. It is admitted as a general prin<'iple of In w that, where a specific mens rea is required,
if the defendant's mistaken state of mind is of such a
nature as to obviate the mens rea,, the required criminal
intent is lacking and the accused cannot be convicted.
However, the court's initial premise in the instant case
i::-; unsound, for it assumes that the required mens rea is
the intent to deprive the possessor of his compensation
and that it was necessary to show an intent to ''steal''
his automobile. This premise is unsound, since the mens
rea is not the intent to steal or to deprive the lienholder
of compensation, but to deprive the lienholder of his
"possessory right." Perkins, Crimin,al Law (1958) page
:2:24. A lienholder has a possessory right to retain the
autmnobile until paid for his work, but has the primary
possessory right to hold the property and, if necessary,
to satisfy the debt against him from that property.
Therefore, the required mens rea, in an offense like that
·with ·which the appellant was charged, is not the intent
to steal but the intent to deprive the lienholder of the
possessory right to the property. The appellant's good
faith would only be a defense if it demonstrated that he
did not intend to deprive the lienholder of the possession
of the vehicle. Not one shred of evidence was before
the court either at the trial or upon appeal which would
show that the appellant had any other intent than to
take the vehicle from the possession of the lienholder
and sell it.
The evidence overwhelmingly shows without a single
contradiction that the appellant intended to sell the ve3
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hicle (R. 66 to 1). Appellant at no time testified that he
intended to return the vehicle or to grant the lienholder
his possessory right. Consequently, the state of mind that
the appellant had at the time he took the vehicle was
clearly that of an intent to deprive the lienholder of his
possessory right, and, although he may have taken the
vehicle under the belief that he had a right to do so, such
a state of mind where the vehicle was taken with the
intent of permanently removing it from the lienholder's
possession would not be such a state of mind as would
exculpate the appellant from the crime charged. As a
consequence, there was no evidence before the trial court
which would have warranted the court in instructing the
jury.
The nature of the circumstances under which a claim
of good faith is made must be examined to determine
·whether or not the claim of good faith would blot out the
criminal intent required. Appellant's position and thus
the court's position would be correct only if the intent
vvould be the general intent to steal as distinct from the
specific intent to deprive of a possessory lienholder's
right. The lienholder has a right, not only to payment for
his work, but a right to satisfy that debt out of the property possessed. Consequently, any act that would deprive
the lienholder of his right to satisfy his debt out of the
property would not be such an intent as could be exculpatory of the required mens rea.
The Supreme Court of Canada in Regina Y. Shymkowich, 1954 S. Ct., 606, had before it a case where the
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l listrict Court of the Province of British Columbia had
entered an acquittal, and the Court of Appeals of British
Columbia affirmed on the grounds that the respondent,
who took logs under the believe that they were abandoned, could exculpate himself because of a good faith
belief. The lower courts had ruled this would be exculpatory of the required intent for the crime. The court ruled :
''The taking into possession and the conversion of the logs obviously was intended to deprive
the owner temporarily at least of its property and
this comes within the express language of the definition of theft given by the Criminal Code."

It is noteworthy that, in the opinion of Justice Estey
to the degree that it relates to the instant facts, he stated:

'' * * * The conduct of the respondent, in the submission of the Crown, in going into and trespassing upon the booming ground with the intent and
purpose of collecting floating logs therein, though
not inside a boom, was itself, in the circumstances,
such evidence of dishonest or wrongful intent
that the mere assertion on his part that he thought
he had a right to collect floating logs would not
establish an honest intent.''
The Supreme Court of Canada reversed the acquittal
and directed that a conviction be entered.
Certainly, therefore, where the instant opinion of the
court is predicated on an erroneous premise as to the
requisite mens rea, the court should withdraw its opinion
and grant rehearing. Further, where the factual status of
the record is such that there is not a scintilla of evidence
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exculpatory of the required men rea actually involved in
the crime, the court should grant a rehearing.
As the court's opinion now stands a mistake of law
has been made, not only by the accused but by the court.
CONCLUSION
The opinion of the court makes a serious and glaring mistake of law in that it assumes that the mental element of the instant offense is other than the intent to deprive the lienholder of the right to satisfy his indebtedness from the possession of property, and assumes that
it is the intent to deprive the lienholder of payment. Since
it is obviously clear that the appellant did intend to deprive the lienholder of possession of his property permanently, the court should affirm the conviction.
Respectfully submitted,
A. PRATT KESLER
Attorney General
RONALD N. BOYCE
Chief Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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